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In 2001, the People’s Union for Civil Liberties submitted a writ petition to the
Supreme Court of India on the “right to food.” The petitioner was a voluntary
human rights organization; the initial respondents were the Government of
India, the Food Corporation of India, and six state governments. The petition
opens with three pointed questions posed to the court:
A. Does the right to life mean that people who are starving and who are too poor to
buy food grains ought to be given food grains free of cost by the State from the surplus
stock lying with the State, particularly when it is reported that a large part of it is lying
unused and rotting?
B. Does not the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India include the
right to food?
C. Does not the right to food, which has been upheld by the Honourable Court, imply
that the state has a duty to provide food especially in situations of drought, to people who
are drought affected and are not in a position to purchase food?1
The petition went on to invoke the Indian state’s own statistics to claim,
“There are more than ﬁve crore (ﬁfty million) people who have been victims
of starvation.”2 There was widespread evidence that, as farmers starved, over-
ﬂowing government stocks of grains were being “destroyed, exported at throw-
away prices, or even allowed to be eaten by rodents instead of distributing them
to starving people.”3 Singling out the state government of Rajasthan, the peti-
tioners argued that the state had failed in “the obligation to protect a citizen’s
right to life enjoined on them by the Indian Constitution.”4
Acknowledgments: I am very grateful to Emma Rothschild and Chandak Sengoopta for their com-
ments on an earlier draft. The anonymous reports from CSSH reviewers were invaluable in helping
me to revise the essay; I have scarcely been able to do justice to their thoughtful critical readings. I
am solely responsible for any mistakes and misunderstandings that remain.
1 People’s Union for Civil Liberties [PUCL] v. Union of India [UOI] and Others, Writ Petition
(Civil), No. 196 of 2001. The full text is available at: http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/case.
html/.
2 PUCL v. UOI and others, § 3.
3 Ibid., § 11.
4 Ibid., § 17.
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“Starvation deaths” are acutely sensitive in modern India; the political
position of hunger has been more ambivalent and complex.5 The Indian State
has prided itself, justiﬁably, on the absence of major famines in India since
independence, in stark contrast to the colonial period.6 Yet, in the same
period, India has also consistently been home to the largest number of malnour-
ished children of any country in the world.7 This paper seeks to trace the gen-
ealogy of the link between food and welfare in modern India, looking
particularly to the late-colonial period, and bringing together intellectual
history with the history of government. Why has hunger been linked so
closely with discourses of justice and legitimate power in modern India?
How have different kinds of hunger been differentiated? What visions of the
Indian population, and of the relation between people and state, did the dis-
course of food generate?
From the late nineteenth century, food was at the heart of secular interven-
tions to improve the welfare of the population of India. Claims and counter-
claims surrounding the production, distribution, consumption, and nutritive
value of food brought together (and into conﬂict) diverse initiatives to
enhance life and prevent death, by the colonial state, Indian social reformers,
nationalist politicians, and British and Indian scientists.8 At the same time,
the problem of hunger and the persistence of starvation provoked the elabor-
ation and extension of religiously informed notions of compassion, charity,
and care, which imagined the population in ways different from those of the
colonial state, and which attached different meanings to the discussion of
pain.9 Thus in Gandhi’s conception, on which this paper focuses, (involuntary)
5 Journalist P. Sainath puts it with characteristic eloquence: “An exclusive focus on ‘starvation
deaths’—disconnected from the larger canvas—seems to imply this: if they don’t die, everything’s
alright. If they lose their land, cannot feed their families, see their children enter bondage, are forced
into debt-driven prostitution—all that is okay. They just shouldn’t starve to death. That’s upsetting.
It’s bad implementation.” P. Sainath, “It’s the Policy, Stupid, Not Implementation,” http://www.
indiatogether.org/opinions/ps1.htm/.
6 Jean Dreze, Famine Prevention in India (London: London School of Economics, 1988); cf.
Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nin˜o Famines and the Making of the Third World
(London: Verso, 1999).
7 Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, India: Development and Participation (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2002).
8 On the British context for such interventions, see the illuminating work of James Vernon,
notably, “The Ethics of Hunger and the Assembly of Society: The Techno-Politics of the School
Meal in Britain,” American Historical Review, 110, 3 (2005): 693–725.
9 As Dipesh Chakrabarty has noted, “The capacity to notice and document suffering (even if it be
one’s own suffering) from the position of a generalized and necessarily disembodied observer is
what marks the beginnings of the modern self.” He argues that where “social thought” sees pain
as “speciﬁc and hence open to secular interventions,” in religious thought “suffering is existential.
It shadows man in his life.” The discourses of food and hunger in modern India brought these
countervailing notions of pain—as necessary or preventable—into contention and dialogue.
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Post-Colonial Thought and Historical Difference
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 119–20.
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hunger occupied a position in a complex ﬁeld that also included forms of what
Talal Asad calls “agentive pain”: above all, the practice of fasting.10
The government of food in modern India developed alongside an imagin-
ation of hunger; the language of science, and in particular nutritional science,
was central to both.11 In making this connection, this paper seeks to restore
the history of moral and political thought to the discussion of governmentality
in colonial and post-colonial India.
S TA RVAT I O N A N D S O C I A L S O L I D A R I T Y
That agricultural production was of cardinal interest to the East India Company
state from the outset hardly needs stating.12 During famines and subsistence
crises, the colonial state stepped in, as its predecessors had done, to forestall
social collapse and avert disorder.13 Nevertheless, the great famines of the
last quarter of the nineteenth century marked a transformation in the nature
of government in colonial India.
Recentworkon the development of colonial governmentality in India has exam-
ined the broader effects of the colonial state’s attempts to understand famine and to
represent it statistically.14 U. Kalpagam has argued that the Famine Code of 1880,
the ﬁrst of its kind in India, represented an important new technology in the state’s
quest to know and characterize the population, in particular by distinguishing the
deserving from the undeserving poor.15 In an important contribution to the ﬁeld,
Sarah Hodges has shown that it was in trying to govern the disorder caused by
famine that the colonial state in India began to measure on a massive scale, and
to envisage a “population” upon which it could act.16 Even more than epidemics,
the famines of the 1870s stimulated the production ofwhatGyanPrakashdescribes
10 Talal Asad, “Thinking about Agency and Pain,” in Formations of the Secular: Christianity,
Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 67–99.
11 This is to suggest that, modifying Gyan Prakash’s argument, it was not only or even primarily
by turning to an “inner and uncolonized tradition” that Indian nationalists were able to appropriate
and “reinscribe” colonial governmentality. Cf. Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the
Imagination of Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
12 Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement
(Paris: Mouton, 1963).
13 Ravi Ahuja, “State Formation and ‘Famine Policy’ in Early Colonial South India,” Indian
Economic and Social History Review 39, 4 (2002): 351–80.
14 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in, Graham Burchill, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller,
eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
Initiators of the debate on colonial governmentality were David Scott, “Colonial Governmentality,”
Social Text 43 (Fall 1995): 191–220; and Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire:
Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1995).
15 U. Kalpagam, “Colonial Governmentality and the ‘Economy,’” Economy and Society 29, 3
(2000): 418–38.
16 Sarah Hodges, “Governmentality, Population and the Reproductive Family in Modern India,”
Economic and Political Weekly 39, 11 (13 Mar. 2004): 1157–63; Sarah Hodges, “Looting the Lock
Hospital in Colonial Madras during the Famine Years of the 1870s,” Social History of Medicine
18 (2005): 379–98.
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as an “elaborate grid of knowledges and practices that sought to produce a colonial
complex of ‘men and things’”17: statistics, surveys, and censuses, and the develop-
ment of an ever-ﬁner mesh of administration.
As importantly, the question of hunger became central to discourses of
legitimate power in India at this time. The protection of the population from star-
vation authorized new forms of political power and political intervention. The
1880 Famine Commission moved beyond any earlier commitments in declaring
that in times of famine, “it becomes a paramount duty of the State to give all prac-
ticable assistance to the people . . . and to devote all its available resources to this
end; and this duty is emphasized by the fact that the Government stands in the
place of landlord to agriculturalists.”18 The Commission devised India’s ﬁrst
Famine Code, the backbone of which was the provision of massive public
works. The Code, and its regional variants, set out detailed guidelines for the
identiﬁcation of conditions that threatened to spill over into famine.19
The manifest failure of the colonial state to prevent the mass starvation of the
1870s and the 1890s, however, left its claim to care for the welfare of the popu-
lation open to critique and appropriation by Indian political economists, social
reformers, and journalists. Using the state’s own statistics, Indian political com-
mentators and political economists challenged the colonial state’s claims in two
ways: First, they shifted the deﬁnition of welfare by turning attention from the
acute crisis of famine to the conditions of everyday life.20 Second, a number of
Indians began to claim that they “knew” the population in ways the colonial
state could not. Romesh Dutt, in his magnum opus on the economic history
of India, claims an intimacy with “the Indian peasant,” resulting from his exten-
sive travels as a colonial ofﬁcial in Bengal. He writes, “The appalling poverty
and joylessness of [the peasant’s] life . . . cannot easily be pictured,” suggesting
that he could picture it and his intended British audience could not.21
For many Indian commentators in the early twentieth century, food signiﬁed
more than energy for the human body. The power of food within political dis-
course came from its embeddedness in culture: as Arjun Appadurai has argued,
food has long fulﬁlled two “diametrically opposed” functions in India: “It can
serve to indicate and construct social relations characterized by equality, inti-
macy or solidarity,” or it can “sustain relations characterized by rank, distance
17 Gyan Prakash, Another Reason, 157. This point was also raised in David Arnold’s presen-
tation on “Famine and Ideas of Welfare in India,” at the conference on Welfare, Land and Taxes,
Trinity Hall, Cambridge, 3 June 2005.
18 Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1880 (Calcutta: Government of India), 31–32.
19 See, for example: Famine Code: Madras Presidency (Madras: Government of Madras, 1883);
Bengal Famine Code, rev. ed. (Calcutta: Government of Bengal, 1892).
20 Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India (London: Swan, Sonnenschein and
Co., 1901), 24.
21 R. C. Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age: From the Accession of Queen
Victoria in 1837 to the Commencement of the Twentieth Century, vol. 2 (London: Kegan, Paul and
Co., 1904).
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or segmentation.”22 Food—particular kinds of food, access to it, the threat of
going without it—reﬂected the kinds of social divisions that preoccupied
increasing numbers of Indians around the turn of the twentieth century: div-
isions between castes, between Hindu and Muslim, and between different
regions of British India.
At the same time, perhapsmorepowerfully, the politics of food could stand at the
heart of new ideas of social solidarity that underpinned the efﬂorescence of volun-
tary activity in the early twentieth century.23 Recognizing the suffering of distant
others could serve to bind community. This embodiment of sympathy was
evident, from the start, in Gandhi’s mode of responding to starvation. In response
to news of famine in India, Gandhi stated, “To be one nation means believing that,
when a single Indian dies of starvation, all of us are dying of it and acting accord-
ingly.”24Writing, as he was, from South Africa, the question of identiﬁcation with
distant others raised itself particularly strongly in his imagination. “If Indians here
[in South Africa] observe the truth in word and deed and behave with courage,” he
wrote, “that cannot but have some effect in India.” Gandhi believed that the pain of
others could literally be “felt by the mind” of an observer.25 His perspective here
exempliﬁes the “complex exchange and circulation of sins and merits” that Fou-
cault saw operating within “pastoral power”: “the force and complexity of the
moral ties binding the shepherd to each member of his ﬂock.”26
Many regional literary traditions in India used hunger and starvation as meta-
phors both for the condition of India, and for the imagination of new regional,
national, and even transnational collectivities.27 The songs and poems of the
Tamil patriot Subramania Bharati, to take one powerful example, abound
with references to hunger. Bharati’s 1921 paean to the “Indian commonwealth”
invokes the need for solidarity in the face of hunger:
Today we make a law and shall
For ever enforce it:
22 Arjun Appadurai, “Gastro-Politics in Hindu South Asia,” American Ethnologist 8, 3 (1981):
494–511, quote p. 496.
23 Carey Watt, Serving the Nation: Cultures of Service, Association and Citizenship (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2005).
24 M. K. Gandhi, “Non-Cooperation Means Self Puriﬁcation,” Navajivan, 27 Jan. 1921, in Col-
lected Works of Mahatma Gandhi [henceforth CWMG ], vol. 19 (New Delhi: Publications Division,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958–1983, 90 vols.), 285.
25 Gandhi, “Five Crores Starving,” Indian Opinion, 28 Mar. 1908, CWMG, vol. 8, 156–57.
26 Michel Foucault, “Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Critique of Political Reason,” in, James
Faubion, ed., Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–84, vol. 3, Robert Hurley et al., trans.
(London: Penguin, 2001), 298–325, quote p. 308; see also “The Subject and Power,” in the
same volume, 326–48, quote pp. 334–35.
27 Sugata Bose, “Nation as Mother: Representations and Contestations of ‘India’ in Bengali
Literature and Culture,” in, S. Bose and A. Jalal, eds., Nationalism, Democracy and Development:
State and Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 50–75; Tanika Sarkar, “Nation-
alist Iconography: Images of Women in 19th-Century Bengali Literature,” Economic and Political
Weekly, 21 Nov. (1987): 2011–15.
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If a single mouth goes without food
The world we will destroy!28
Underlying this concern of all with the hunger of any one was a vision of the
nation, once again communicated in the language of family and kinship, articu-
lating a vision of social solidarity that transcended the divisions of caste and
community:
We are all one clan, we are all one people,
All, all are India’s children;
Of equal status, equal weight,
Of equal value, all of us
are kings in this land!
“All of us are kings in this land,” suggested a new kind of popular sover-
eignty, a power that resided in the population itself.
To juxtapose the concerns of the colonial state with those of a small but vocal
Indian elite is to see two rather different discourses circulating within Indian
political circles by the early decades of the twentieth century: one largely
concerned with food, the other focusing more on hunger—the bodily experi-
ence, the pain, of lacking food. Each entailed different political possibilities.29
The focus on food authorized new kinds of state intervention in the agrarian
economy, new systems to monitor and prevent the generalized lack of
food that threatened famine. To focus on hunger was to emphasize, rather,
the development of a greater sense of social consciousness and social
solidarity, even willingness towards sacriﬁce, on the part of those with food
(that is, the wealthy and powerful), with respect to those that were hungry
(the poor).
The intersection of discourses of food and hunger in the broader struggle for
hegemony between the colonial state and the nationalist elite would shape, in
the inter-war years, the content of “welfare” in late-colonial India, with
lasting consequences. In the process, the fractures as well as the expanse of
the pastoral power which nationalist elites, welfare workers, and social refor-
mers exercised over the population became clear.
E N H A N C I N G L I F E
The full scale and impact of agrarian commercialization on the consumption of
food did not become apparent until the inter-war years, and this had a signiﬁ-
cant effect on the development of “pastoral power” in India. It appeared by this
time that famine no longer threatened in India as once it had; the existence of
28 Subramania Bharati, “Bharata Samudayam,” Tamil original available at: http://www.tamilna-
tion.org/literature/bharathy/kavithaikal/thesiya1.htm#17._????_????????. I have slightly modiﬁed
the translation, “Bharat Commonwealth,” in Poems of Subramania Bharathy—A Selection,
P. S. Sundaram, trans. (Madras: Vikas Publishing House, 1982).
29 I owe this formulation of the point to an anonymous CSSH reviewer.
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the Famine Code and improvements in transportation led many to believe there
would never again be mass mortality from famine.30 There was no major
famine in the country between 1908 and 1943.31 However, the new science
of nutrition introduced new ways of thinking about the value of food, and
the importance of particular foods not only in preventing death but also in
enhancing life. Proteins, vitamins, and “protective” foods entered common
vocabulary in India, spreading rapidly beyond the conﬁnes of laboratory
science. Just as the threat of famine appeared to recede in India, the extent of
malnutrition became clear.32
The global economic depression of the 1930s placed in sharp relief the work-
ings of world markets in food, and their failings.33 Was food in the process of
becoming a pure commodity, with no value beyond that given to it by the
market?34 Should the value of food be determined by the application of nutri-
tional science, and according to the capacity of different foods to enrich life? Or
did food retain its status as a “bio-moral” substance, constitutive of the body of
the nation and capable of effecting moral transformation through its consump-
tion? The notion of “protective” food gained new layers of meaning.
Nutritional analysis could reveal the population in both its diversity and its
singularity. On an aggregate level, it revealed that the Indian population’s con-
dition of life was dire. In the words of N. Gangulee, a member of the Royal
Commission on Indian Agriculture (1926–1928) and a retired professor at
the University of Calcutta, “No matter where one looks in India one sees
chronic starvation, ill-health and premature death.” He argued, “Local
surveys of dietaries show that the Indian communities have not been able to
adjust their food requirements to the circumstances of their life and labour,”
with the result that “the majority of the labouring class is starved, nervous,
weakly and morose.”35 By developing and lending greater scientiﬁc authority
to the observations of the likes of Dadabhai Naoroji a generation earlier, nutri-
tional analysis could provide a snapshot of the Indian population and its lack
of vitality.
30 Alexander Loveday, History and Economics of Indian Famines (London: G. Bell and Sons,
1914).
31 For the demographic evidence, see T. Dyson, ed., India’s Historical Demography: Studies in
Famine, Disease and Society (London: Curzon, 1989).
32 On the broader colonial context, see M. Worboys, “The Discovery of Colonial Malnutrition,”
in, D. Arnold, ed., Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies (Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press, 1988), 208–25. The best discussion of India is David Arnold’s “Discovery of Malnu-
trition and Diet in Colonial India,” Indian Economic and Social Review 31, 1 (1994): 1–26.
33 Here the early interest taken by the League of Nations in the question of nutrition helped to
“globalize” it. The League’s work on the impact of poverty and unemployment on industrial
workers’ diets in Europe lent itself to global replication. On this process, see Sunil Amrith,
Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930–65 (New York: Palgrave,
2006), ch. 1.
34 The proliferation of family budget studies suggested, implicitly, that this was the case.
35 N. Gangulee, Health and Nutrition in India (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), 26–27.
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At the same time, new understandings of nutrition, and the technologies
associated with them—consisting primarily of diet surveys—allowed for a
much ﬁner-grained analysis of hunger in India, and its distribution within
and across different sections of the population and even within families. This
was a ﬁrst step toward more targeted interventions to redress imbalances in
the availability and consumption of food. The broadest contrast was drawn
in terms of India’s agrarian and cultural regions, between the relatively better-
nourished “wheat-eaters” and the malnourished “rice-eaters.”36 Yet, even this
familiar distinction in colonial medical thinking was destabilized, lending
greater ﬂuidity to the idea of population.37 Rather than reﬂecting inherent
racial aptitudes, diet preferences now appeared as a socio-cultural phenomenon
open to inﬂuence and even transformation. A new sense of agency and con-
straint entered discussions of hunger, with a focus not just on what people
chose to eat, but also on what they could afford to eat.38
Beyond these broad contrasts, successive dietary surveys showed that certain
sections of the population were more vulnerable. Studies showed that industrial
workers in India’s towns—in general a fairly well-surveyed population, closely
under the gaze of employers and the state—suffered from widespread nutri-
tional deﬁciency, in both quantity and quality.39 Perhaps more serious, and
central to the discourse of Indian nationalism, was the nutritional status of
the “mothers of ‘Mother India,’” and the ﬁnding that “nutrition is at the
bottom of the problem of maternal mortality.”40 Studies undertaken on the
tea plantations of Assam and elsewhere showed that anemia was a key factor
in India’s high levels of maternal mortality.41 W. R. Aykroyd’s extensive
36 See Robert McCarrison and Roland Norris, “The Relationship of Rice to Beri-Beri in India,”
Indian Medical Research Memoirs 2 (1924); Gangulee, Nutrition; W. R. Aykroyd, “Nutrition in
India,” in, League of Nations, Health Organization, Intergovernmental Conference of Far
Eastern Countries on Rural Hygiene, C.H. 1235b, Geneva, Apr. 1937; W. R. Aykroyd, Note on
the Results of Diet Surveys in India (Simla: India Research Fund, 1940). For further discussion
of this distinction between rice and wheat, see Arnold, “Discovery of Malnutrition.”
37 For a sense of the older tradition of colonial writing on diet and race, see John Wilson John-
ston, A Contribution to the Dynamics of Racial Diet in India (Edinburgh: Mclachlan and Stewart,
1876). For an early contrast between “ordinary” diets and those under conditions of captivity, see
W. R. Cornish, Reports on the Nature of the Food of the Inhabitants of the Madras Presidency and
on the Dietaries of Prisoners in Zillah Jails (Madras: United Scottish Press,1863). For a more
detailed discussion of these themes, see Arnold, “Discovery of Malnutrition.”
38 Aykroyd, “Nutrition in India.”
39 See, for example, A. C. Roy Choudhury, Report of an Enquiry into the Standard of Living
of Jute Mill Workers in Bengal (Calcutta: Government of Bengal, 1930); N. K. Adyanthaya,
Report of an Enquiry into the Family Budgets of Industrial Workers in Madras City (Madras: Gov-
ernment of Madras, 1938).
40 Gangulee, Nutrition, 128.
41 L. Wills and M. M. Mehta, “Studies in Pernicious Anaemia of Pregnancy,” Indian Journal
of Medical Research 17 (1930): 777–92; Margaret Balfour, “Maternity Conditions and Anaemia
in the Assam Tea-Gardens,” Journal of the Association of Medical Women in India 21 (1933):
28–38; and Balfour brings together concerns with childbearing women, and industrial workers,
in, “Diseases of Pregnancy and Labour in India, with Special Reference to Community,”
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surveys of South Indian schoolchildren revealed this was another key popu-
lation “at risk.”42 Harijans (dalits), too, suffered disproportionately from
nutritional deﬁciencies.43
Yet, precisely because of the powerful semiotic valence of food, the clinical
language of malnutrition lent itself to appropriation and translation in support
of other visions of the Indian population. The use of science to develop and
enhance a national “moral economy”—emphasizing not the distinctions
between different sections of the population as targets for government interven-
tion, but commensality and solidarity—is particularly clear in Gandhi’s enthu-
siastic deployment of the international language of nutritional science in the
1930s.
Food was central to Gandhi’s life and to his politics.44 Drawing on indigen-
ous traditions, particularly on Jainism, and on a range of inﬂuences from abroad
including the example of Trappist monks, the practice of fasting was central to
Gandhi’s life: it served as a form of bodily puriﬁcation, as penitential self-
abnegation, and a form of political protest. Gandhi prided himself on, and
his followers admired, his bodily discipline. Gandhi’s secretary Pyarelal
wrote in the midst of the Mahatma’s fast unto death in 1931 in protest
against the proposal for separate electorates for Dalits, “One could not help
being struck by the way in which he economized his strength. He had
reduced it to a science.”45
Gandhi’s “science” of the body emerged from his ceaseless “experiments”
going back to his time spent in London and South Africa.46 However,
Gandhi was able to harness some of his ethical and dietary prescriptions for
others to the new authority of nutritional science, including his fervent veg-
etarianism, and his belief in the importance of simple, un-spiced food as the
key to continence and bodily discipline.47 His reading of nutritional tracts
did not transform, so much as reinforce Gandhi’s fundamental conceptions
of “diet and diet reform.” In his correspondence with noted nutritionists
Proceedings of the Seventh Congress of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine (Cal-
cutta: Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine, 1927), 318–28.
42 W. R. Aykroyd and K. Rajagopal, “The State of Nutrition in Schoolchildren in South India,”
Indian Journal of Medical Research 24, 2 (1936): 419–38; W. R. Aykroyd and S. Krishnan, “The
State of Nutrition of Schoolchildren in Three Towns of South India,” Indian Journal of Medical
Research 24, 3 (1937): 707–26.
43 Gangulee, Nutrition, 119.
44 Joseph Alter, “Gandhi’s Body, Gandhi’s Truth: Nonviolence and the Biomoral Imperative
of Public Health,” The Journal of Asian Studies 55, 2 (1996): 301–22; David Arnold, Gandhi:
Proﬁles in Power (London: Longman, 2001).
45 Pyarelal, Epic Fast (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1932), 44.
46 Alter, “Gandhi’s Body.”
47 See, inter alia, “Dietetic Changes,” Harijan, 27 July 1935, in, M. K. Gandhi, Diet and Diet
Reform (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1948), 86–87; “Minimum Diet,” Harijan,
31 Aug. 1935, in ibid., 30; “Polished v. Unpolished,” Harijan, 26 Oct. 1934, in ibid., 44–46.
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(and successive directors of the Coonoor Nutrition Research Laboratories),
published in Harijan and Young India, Gandhi made the case for the nutritional
virtues of a vegetarian diet.48 Nutritionists with long experience of India did not
discount these views, though they tended to emphasize more than Gandhi the
value of milk. “I am glad you are interesting yourself in the matter of food and I
agree with much that you say,” Robert McCarrison wrote to Gandhi, “but let me
assure you that a little more fortissimo on the “milk and milk-products theme”
will do great good when you are leading the orchestra of Truth.”49
As well as drawing on nutritional knowledge to enhance discipline and vital-
ity on an individual basis, Gandhi turned his attention toward the ability of food
to enhance life on a more aggregated level. Healthy and nutritive food was but
the beginning of the transformation Gandhi envisaged. In his vision, a trans-
formation in bodily practice would herald a growth in national consciousness
and an improvement and uniﬁcation of the Indian “race.” Gandhi insisted,
“If we would be national instead of provincial we would have to have an inter-
change of habits as to food, simplify our tastes and produce healthy dishes all
can take with impunity. . .. Volunteers will have to learn the art of cooking and
for this purpose they will have also to study the values of different foods and
evolve common dishes easily and cheaply prepared.”50
Here, “national food” is something that will come about through active cre-
ation, transcending the divisions and distinctions implied by the myriad of
“provincial habits” governing diets and eating habits across India. For
Gandhi, “national food” would have three main components. The ﬁrst was veg-
etarianism, arguably thus excluding a large proportion of India’s population.
“The unlimited capacity of the plant world to sustain man at his highest,”
Gandhi wrote, was “yet unexplored by modern medical science,” and it
stood to be explored by Indian medical men in particular, “whose tradition is
vegetarian.”51 The second component of “national food” involved a kind of
social leveling, contrasting “common food for common people”52 with the
lavish and indulgent foods used by the upper castes as a marker of distinction.
Repeatedly, Gandhi linked the consumption of simple, nutritive food with the
act of home spinning and the wearing of khadi.53 Finally, Gandhi associated the
48 Gandhi, Diet and Diet Reform.
49 Robert McCarrison, letter to Gandhi in Young India, 15 Aug. 1929, in ibid., 24–25.
50 Gandhi, “National Food,” Harijan, 5 Jan. 1934, in Diet and Diet Reform (Ahmedabad:
Navajivan Publishing House, 1949), 29–30.
51 Gandhi, “Unﬁred Food Experiment,” Young India, 18 July 1929, in ibid., 18.
52 Gandhi, “National Food.”
53 See, for example, Gandhi’s notion of a “cloth famine”: Speech to Students of Gujarat Maha-
vidyalaya, Ahmedabad, 13 Jan. 1921, CWMG, vol. 22. For further discussion, see C. A. Bayly,
“The Origins of Swadeshi (Home Industry): Cloth and Indian Society, 1700–1930,” in Origins
of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 172–209; and Emma Tarlo, Clothing Matters: Dress
and Identity in India (London: Hurst, 1996).
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evolution of nutritive “national food” with the actual practice of preparing and
sharing food, using his ashram as a ﬁeld of experiment in training volunteers to
cook and eat together as a gesture of solidarity, aiming to transcend, through
practice, distinctions of caste and status.54 That is to say, “national food,”
which lay always in the future, would both provide for minimum bodily
needs, and foster bonds of solidarity and reciprocity within the body of
the nation.
In bridging the function of food in creating community with the pressing
imperative of improving the welfare of all, the science of nutrition played a
crucial role.55 Nutritional science provided a new language, a new measure
of the “value” of food, juxtaposed against the value given to food by the
market. Gandhi’s writings on nutrition are full of references to the latest
research on the subject: he referred, for example, to Robert McCarrison’s exper-
iments with rats,56 to The Newer Knowledge of Nutrition by E. V. McCollum,
and to homegrown texts such as Balanced Diets, by H. V. Tilak of the Bombay
Presidency Baby and Health Week Association. He carried on a public corre-
spondence with both McCarrison and Aykroyd.57 Above all, Gandhi gave
pride of place—because of its authority and its universality—to the League
of Nations Health Committee’s seminal ﬁndings on the physiological bases
of human nutrition in 1936; a summary of the report immediately appeared
in the pages of Harijan, one of Gandhi’s main outlets of publication.58 In his
search for a diet that would bring national vigor and vitality, Gandhi turned
to the scientiﬁc authority of the League of Nations, and its claim to have
discovered universal minimum standards.
For Gandhi, being able to invoke nutritional “values” to supplement his con-
ception of food as a bio-moral substance enabled him to amplify his critique of
the market as the arbiter of value, and elevate the household and the village
community as the sites of virtuous, ethical production and consumption. Not
only did polished rice weaken the vitality of the population, it was an
example of the economic and moral impoverishment of India’s villages
through mechanization and commoditization. “If rice can be pounded in the
54 Gandhi, “ATalk to Village Workers,” extract from a talk given on 22 Oct. 1935, in Diet and
Diet Reform, 31–33. On this occasion, Gandhi had invited almost one hundred village workers to
his ashram and had prepared for them a special meal that reﬂected his vision for “national food”:
cheap, wholesome, vegetarian, and distinctively Indian.
55 Indeed, the language of nutrition was at least as crucial in this regard as was the resort to indi-
genous medical and scientiﬁc practices that Gyan Prakash emphasizes in Another Reason.
56 Wellcome Contemporary Medical Archive Centre, London, papers of R. McCarrison, GC
205: R. McCarrison, Nutrition and Health, Being the Cantor Lectures Delivered before the
Royal Society of Arts, 1936 (London: The McCarrison Society, n.d.).
57 Gandhi, “Unﬁred Foods,” Young India, 15 Aug. 1929, in Diet and Diet Reform, 26–27.
58 “Findings of the International Commission of Experts Appointed by the Health Committee of
the League of Nations,” Harijan, 25 Apr. 1936, in Diet and Diet Reform, 101. The original report
was: League of Nations, Report on the Physiological Bases of Nutrition, League of Nations Docu-
ment A.12(a), 1936.
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villages after the old fashion,” he argued, “the wages will ﬁll the pockets of the
rice pounding sisters and the rice eating millions will get some sustenance from
the unpolished rice instead of pure starch which the polished rice provides.” In
this vision, the link between virtue, justice, and nutrition is intimate. “Human
greed,” he concluded “which takes no count of the health or the wealth of the
people who come under its heels, is responsible for the hideous rice-mills one
sees in all the rice-producing tracts.”59
For Gandhi, the notion of minimum standards served as a form of social
leveling, part of his critique of luxury and excess. “Common food for
common people,” as he put it, could begin to foster a new, national sense of
social solidarity rather than division. For other observers, however, the
science of nutrition promised to detach food from culture and custom
altogether, by turning it into quantiﬁable units of energy. As Nick Cullather
has put it, nutritional measurement could suggest, “Food has a uniform
meaning . . . and a standard value that can be tabulated as easily as currency
or petroleum.”60 Food, disembedded from its cultural meanings, could thus
acquire the “character of calculability” and enter into an economy of
equivalences.61
Such a conception was attractive to a small but eloquent group of left-leaning
Indian nationalists, committed to using science and technology to transform
India (I call them, as shorthand, India’s “modernists”), who had begun to
look toward experiments in state-building and planning elsewhere in the
world, and not only in the Soviet Union, as the answer to India’s chronic
poverty.62
In the modernist imagination, nutrition thus came to be something useful
to the state. The National Planning Committee—the Congress party’s
state-in-waiting, led by Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose—was unequivocal.
“The prevalent under-nutrition and malnutrition should be tackled by systema-
tic crop planning,” they declared, “stressing the production of heavy-yielding,
energy-producing and also protective foodstuffs.”63 It was no bad thing, for the
planners, if food were to become a pure commodity, devoid of spirit and deeper
59 Gandhi, “Polished v. Unpolished.”
60 Nick Cullather, “Foreign Policy of the Calorie,” American Historical Review 112, 2 (2007):
337–64.
61 Following, here, the usage of Timothy Mitchell, The Rule of Experts: Egypt, Technopolitics,
Modernity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002). I am grateful to an
anonymous CSSH reviewer for clarifying this point.
62 For a recent perspective on the intellectual history of planning in India, see Benjamin
Zachariah, Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
63 National Planning Committee, Population: Report of the Sub-Committee, Chair:
Dr Radhakamal Mukherjee, K. T. Shah, ed. (Bombay: Vohra and Co, 1947), 144–45. The Planning
Committee’s reports were published after 1947, but their discussions took place between 1938 and
1940, and should therefore be read in the context of the debates of the 1930s.
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moral signiﬁcance, so long as the state regulated and controlled the production
and distribution of the commodity. Gripped by an awareness of the powerful
semiotics of food in Indian society, and the potential such deeper meanings
had to derail the plans, the Planning Committee demanded, “all social
customs, religious taboos and injunctions which now stand in the way of the
husbandry of soil resources and efﬁcient utilisation of available food resources
have now to be abjured to mitigate the effects of chronic food shortage and
poverty.”64 It would be difﬁcult to ﬁnd a clearer statement of the modernist
conception that nutritional values, vital values, were the highest values.
The end that the Planning Committee had in mind was the efﬁciency of the
population, which meant, in effect, the efﬁciency of labor. As the late Raj
Chandavarkar reminded us, by the 1930s the struggle to control and subdue
labor was at the forefront of both colonial and elite Indian strategies of govern-
ment.65 This quest for efﬁciency expressed itself through a fervent belief in
eugenics, of course, as much as through a desire for “national food planning.”66
The values of nutritional science reinforced the modernists’ conception of
labor in India in terms of what Marx called “abstract labour”: the notion that
“all labour is an expenditure of human labour-power, in the physiological
sense,” a “productive expenditure of human brains, muscles, nerves. . . .”67
Thus the Planning Committee suggested an interchangeable equivalence
between the components of nutrition and the living, working human being,
thinking of them collectively as “Energy Units, or some such equally effective
and truly representative medium of measurement.”68 This was a vision of life
in terms of its stripped-down, biological essence.
The Congress Planning Committee was particularly concerned with India’s
growing population; if they did not share Malthusian pessimism, they neverthe-
less regarded the challenge of feeding India’s “teeming millions” as a funda-
mental one.69 In his widely read book, Food Planning for Four Hundred
Millions, Radhakamal Mukherjee—head of the Planning Committee’s group
on population—suggested, “In order to facilitate calculations of total food
requirements the population is reduced to a common consumption unit by
64 National Planning Committee, Population, 127.
65 Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, “Customs of Governance: Colonialism and Democracy in Twen-
tieth Century India,” Modern Asian Studies 41, 3 (2007): 441–70.
66 On the Planning Committee’s obsession with eugenics, see my “Political Culture of Health
in India: A Historical Perspective,” Economic and Political Weekly, 13 Jan. (2007): 114–21; and
Benjamin Zachariah, “Uses of Scientiﬁc Argument: The Case of Development in India,
c. 1930–1950,” Economic and Political Weekly, 29 Sept. (2001): 3689–702.
67 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes, trans. (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1976), 130, 134. For an elaboration in the Indian context, see Dipesh
Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000).
68 National Planning Committee, Population, 14.
69 Gyan Chand, India’s Teeming Millions (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939).
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assigning proper weights for sex and age differences.” He accorded to the
Indian population a “man value” per head: children from birth to ﬁfteen
years of age: 0.7; males over ﬁfteen years old: 1.0; women over ﬁfteen: 0.83.70
The modernists in the Congress were as interested as Gandhi was in forging
bonds of national solidarity, and indeed many were deeply preoccupied with
the social and communal divisions that seemed to intensify in the 1930s.
However, precisely because they saw the welfare of the population as their
highest end, the modernists voiced deep suspicion of India’s “moral
economy” and traditional patterns of obligation and reciprocity. At the heart
of the Planning Committee’s vision was a stinging critique of charity, which
had provided the moral and ethical basis for the elite imagination of hunger
since the later nineteenth century. They presented the principle of sympathy,
the nation as family, as both outmoded and inefﬁcient.
The Planning Committee was sure that “when planned society comes fully
into being, occasions for individual unorganized or sporadic charity will
have no place,” even if this charity was motivated by an ethic of “service”
(seva) or self-sacriﬁce. Love for one’s fellow Indians as brothers and sisters,
this seemed to suggest, was simply not enough. An ethic of sharing was too
unreliable to form the basis of a new national community. The modernist
leaders of the Congress were convinced that “misfortunes for which such
charity is at present provided will be far rarer then, and such as occur will be
guarded against by the collective obligation of the state.”71
However, two challenges faced the Congress Planning Committee’s vision
of National Food Planning, both of which would have lasting implications.
The ﬁrst was that India’s leading nutritionists never made simple claims that
nutritional science could somehow detach food from culture; they were
keenly aware that cultural preferences and hierarchies as well as religious
beliefs and taboos would shape people’s food choices. N. Gangulee wrote
that Hindus “have a tenacious preference for diets determined by religious
bias and are usually averse to any change.” Highlighting a phenomenon that
the grammar of planning could not accommodate, he noted that the “inﬂuence
of communal groups and their pressure often functions as a deterrent to new or
tabooed foods.”72 India’s Muslims were “comparatively free” from food
restrictions, yet had to “draw upon the common supply of foodstuffs,” so
that the main marker of Muslim distinctiveness lay in “methods of food prep-
aration.”73 Gangulee did not appear to believe, like the Congress Planning
Committee, that “all social customs, religious taboos and injunctions”
70 Radhakamal Mukherjee, Food Planning for Four Hundred Millions (London: MacMillan,
1938).
71 National Planning Committee, Population, 145.
72 Gangulee, Nutrition, 199.
73 Ibid., 200–1.
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governing diet could be “abjured.” Where they might have agreed was in con-
cluding, “the only real solution for the problem of malnutrition . . . is an
appreciable rise in the income of the workers and peasants.”74
Thus, the second, and perhaps the greater challenge to the regulation of
food by wise planners lay in the deepening and expansion of food markets in
India. To take one striking illustration, by 1939 there were over three
hundred commodity exchanges in India, dealing in rice, turmeric, sugar
and pepper, and oilseeds and cotton; they traded in both options and
futures.75 In their extensive investigations into the food economy of South
India, W. R. Aykroyd and his Indian colleagues became convinced that the
value given to food by the market did not accord with the optimization of nutri-
tional value.76
As he traveled the length and breadth of South India conducting diet surveys
in the later 1930s, Aykroyd became aware of the tendency of colonial “devel-
opment” to mitigate the risk of absolute starvation but to worsen chronic mal-
nutrition. Aykroyd’s pioneering research had shown that the preponderance of
highly milled rice in the South Indian diet led to a range of nutritional
deﬁciencies, a result of the lack of proteins and “protective foods,” and particu-
larly leafy vegetables.77 He and his colleagues concluded that paddy was
becoming “an article of commerce,” and lamented that with the proceeds of
paddy sales villagers would buy less nutritious machine-milled rice, often
imported from Burma or Siam.78
With the increasing role of markets in determining the availability and the
distribution of food, India’s future policymakers tended to emphasize the
need to govern food production, supply, and distribution within a protected
national economy. The tension between agrarian commercialization and the
aim of governing to ensure the population’s welfare was a key point of friction
in Indian political culture from this point onward.
T H E R E T U R N O F S TA RVAT I O N
Traditionally, the clash between the nationalist movement and the colonial state
appears as a struggle over sovereignty—the right to rule. However, already by
the 1920s both sides claimed that their ends were higher than sovereignty; both
argued that they could best care for the welfare and improvement of the
74 Ibid., 234.
75 V. Venkatesan, “Hoarder’s Delight,” Frontline, 25 Apr. (2008): 22.
76 W. R. Aykroyd, “The Economic Aspects of the Problem of Nutrition in India,” Indian Journal
of Social Work 2, 3 (1941): 269–82.
77 A synthesis of Aykroyd’s many studies can be found in W. R. Aykroyd, B. G. Krishnan,
R. Passmore, and A. R. Sundararajan (Coonoor Nutrition Research Laboratory), Indian Medical
Research Memoirs, No. 32, The Rice Problem in India (Jan. 1940), British Library; Asia, Paciﬁc
and Africa Collection; India Ofﬁce Records [henceforth IOR], V/25/850/92.
78 Aykroyd et al., The Rice Problem in India.
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population.79 Nehru put this starkly in a letter to a British charity worker in
1929: “If the government at present functioning in India were really desirous
of attacking and eradicating poverty, they would realize that the responsibility
for this poverty is theirs and therefore the speediest way of ending it is to
remove themselves from the scene of action, liquidate their government and
make room for others who can tackle the problem with greater disinterestedness
and competence than they have shown.”80 The key was that Indian nationalists
held the initiative in expanding the notion of welfare, goading the colonial state
into trying to match their claims. The enrichment of life became the ultimate
end of government.81 Under the pressures of the Second World War,
however, this loose consensus crumbled.
The return of mass starvation to India, in Bengal in 1943, came as a traumatic
shock. Certainly, Malthusians of all stripes had maintained a degree of pessi-
mism regarding the inevitability of another famine. Nevertheless, the 1930s
had witnessed a shift toward a view of food as enhancing life, rather than
simply sustaining it, and small-scale experiments, surveys, and reforms
abounded. “The days when we could cast the blame on the gods for all our
ills are past,” Nehru had written in 1929; “Modern science claims to have
curbed to a large extent the tyranny and the vagaries of nature.”82
But neither science nor the modern state could protect the three million
Bengalis who died in the famine of 1943–1944. Indeed, it was clear even at
the time that the colonial state did much to create the conditions for famine.
Trying to shape the ﬁner details of people’s diets appeared a luxury, when
the prospect of absolute scarcity seemed so near. A generation of writing decry-
ing the nutritional evils of white rice gave way to desperate attempts to increase
and regulate rice production, in India and in Southeast Asia as a whole.83
Indian nationalists, many of them imprisoned during the famine after the
Quit India movement of 1942, as well as social welfare workers, nutritionists
and communists, observed the famine with horror, and began to draw
lessons from the experience. Few were more eloquent on this point than
Nehru, writing his Discovery of India from Ahmadnagar jail, and it was
79 As Michel Foucault put it in his lectures on sovereignty and biopolitics, “One might say this:
It is as though power, which used to have sovereignty as its modality or organising schema, found
itself unable to govern the economic and political body of a society that was undergoing both a
demographic explosion and industrialization.” M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures
at the Colle`ge de France, 1975–76, David Macey, trans. (London: Penguin, 2003), 249.
80 Jawaharlal Nehru to B. J. K. Hallowes (Deputy Commissioner, Allahabad and President of the
Famine Relief Fund of Gonda), 26 June 1929, in, S. Gopal and Uma Iyengar, eds., The Essential
Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 12.
81 Cf. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended.
82 Nehru to B. J. K. Hallowes, 26 June 1929.
83 IOR/M/4/936, Food: Rice Study Group, Feb.–Jun. 1947; IOR/M/4/809, Food: International
Emergency Food Council; Singapore Sub-Committee on Rice, Oct. 1946–Oct. 1947.
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already clear as the war drew to a close that Nehru’s views would be of great
consequence for India’s future.
The ﬁrst lesson was perhaps the obvious one: that any claim the colonial state
could make of caring for the welfare of the Indian population was now bank-
rupt. “In any democratic or semi-democratic country,” Nehru stressed, “such a
calamity would have swept away all the governments concerned with it,” par-
ticularly when it was clear, as in Bengal, that “it was a man-made famine which
could have been foreseen and avoided.”84 The root of the problem was that the
government, “constituted as it is” was “completely occupied in its primary task
of ensuring its own continuance.”85
Perhaps more shocking was what the famine had revealed about the “moral
sentiments” of India. Contemporary commentary abounds with references to
the complete breakdown of relations of moral obligation in the midst of the
famine, something Paul Greenough showed with great force and clarity in
his classic work on the event.86 The Bengali communist Bhowani Sen,
whose account of the famine is one of the best known, wrote, “Women sell
themselves literally in hordes, and young boys act as pimps for the military.
After having tolerated theft, bribery and deception we have come to a stage
where we fail to stand up even to this barbarism.”87 Patrons abandoned
clients, fathers abandoned women and children.88 Greenough argues that
these were conscious choices, designed to perpetuate the male descent line.89
Nehru, who must have read accounts like these in prison, noted with revul-
sion that as “the streets of Calcutta were strewn with corpses,” the elites con-
tinued with their “dancing and feasting and a ﬂaunting of luxury.” The horse
races went on, and though transport was lacking to provide food to the starving,
“racehorses came in special boxes by rail from other parts of the country.”90
Nehru argued that such behavior was to be expected of the British, “for they
had lived their life apart, caste-bound as they were”; the real horror lay in
the spectacle of “those Indians who functioned in this way.” A “wide gulf”
84 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund/Oxford
University Press, 2003 [1946]), 496.
85 Ibid., 498.
86 Paul Greenough, Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 1943–4
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). This remains the best English language history of
the famine.
87 Bhowani Sen, Rural Bengal in Ruins, N. Chakravarty, trans. (Bombay: People’s Publishing
House, 1945).
88 P. C. Mahalanobis, Ramakrishna Mukerjea, Ambika Ghosh, A Sample Survey of the After-
Effects of the Bengal Famine of 1943 (Calcutta: Statistical Publishing Society, 1946);
T. G. Narayan, Famine over Bengal (Calcutta: Book Company, Ltd., 1944). See also the classic
analysis in Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay in Entitlement and Deprivation
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
89 Greenough, Prosperity and Misery. See also Paul Greenough, “Indian Famines and Peasant
Victims: The Case of Bengal in 1943–4,” Modern Asian Studies 14, 2 (1980): 205–35.
90 Nehru, Discovery of India, 497.
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separated these Indian elites from “their own people,” and “no considerations
even of decency and humanity” could bridge this gulf.91 Only a thoroughgoing
transformation of the state could stand in the stead of “decency” and “human-
ity”. As Appadurai has pointed out, many observers of the famine witnessed
the “moral opposite of Bengali ideas of reciprocity and nurture.”92
The Bengal famine underscored the intimate connection between food and
political justice. It was the colonial state’s refusal to provide rice to the starving
that so dramatically represented the bankruptcy of its legitimacy. But the star-
vation also highlighted that there were “enemies of the people” within the
national body. Writing in 1944, Gandhi returned to and ampliﬁed a theme
from his earlier writings on food: the pernicious role of hoarders in causing
people to starve. “Today our own people are depriving the public of food
grains,” he wrote, “I cannot tolerate our people behaving thus, and collecting
vast fortunes at the cost of people’s starvation.” Corruption “is already there
in the Government,” he declared, “but it has increased to a very great extent
amongst those middlemen who live on brokerage.”93
Communist commentators were even more forthright on this point. They
blamed the famine on government inaction in the face of hoarders and
speculators. Writing of the food situation in the United Provinces in 1944,
S. G. Sardesai observed the behavior of local grain merchants, and concluded,
“A more bare-faced demand for absolute and unbridled proﬁteering could not
be made.. . . A more frank confession that the usual rise in prices and vanishing
of goods that follow control measures are . . . deliberately manipulated by the
trader-hoarders, to blow up price-control, procurement and rationing, could
not be given.”94 He argued, in support of the government’s war effort, “Total
mobilization means vigorous and just procurement of the genuine surplus
from rural areas, vigorous price controls, and total rationing in cities.”95 The
Keralan communist leader E. M. S. Namboodiripad put it succinctly: “Govern-
ment proposes, black marketeer disposes.”96
The sight of starvation and the failure of reciprocity and social solidarity now
furnished an imagination of disaster that scarred the psyche of Nehru’s gener-
ation of Indian leaders. Having asserted that national sovereignty would allevi-
ate the problem of starvation, Nehru and his contemporaries were haunted by
the prospect of failure. “We live continually on the verge of disaster in India,
and indeed disaster sometimes overwhelms us,” Nehru wrote.97 Writing
91 Ibid., 497.
92 Arjun Appadurai, “How Moral is South Asia’s Economy?—A Review Article,” The Journal
of Asian Studies 43, 3 (1984): 481–97, quote p. 485.
93 Gandhi, Talk with Mridula Sarabhai, Sevagram, 26 Oct. 1944, CWMG, vol. 78, 234.
94 S. G. Sardesai, Food in the United Provinces (Bombay: People’s Publishing House, 1944), 19.
95 Ibid., 36–37.
96 E. M. S. Namboodiripad, Food in Kerala (Bombay: People’s Publishing House, 1944), 16.
97 Nehru, Discovery of India, 535.
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in 1944, the Patna University economist and demographer Gyan Chand put it
starkly: “Ours is a death-ridden country. We might very well adopt the human
skull as our national emblem.”98
In this context, deaths from starvation represented a double indictment: they
signaled both the enduring power of nature over the planned society of science
and rationality and the failure of government to fulﬁll its minimum obligations.
The very real fears of another “breakdown”—in food supplies, social order, or
civilization itself—help to explain the language of crisis and emergency that
continued to be used in connection with the “food problem” in independent
India, throughout Nehru’s premiership and beyond.
F O O D , S O V E R E I G N T Y, A N D W E L FA R E
The Second World War wrecked the regional food economies of South and
Southeast Asia that had developed over the previous half-century and teetered
on the brink of collapse as a result of the Great Depression.99 Moreover, it had
become clear that the operation of regional and local food markets optimized
neither nutrition nor security, and in the crisis of war, failed to prevent and
perhaps even hastened starvation.100 In this context, two countervailing but
related tendencies set in. The ﬁrst was an assertion of the state’s sovereignty
over the economy and in particular over the production and distribution of
food. The second, paradoxically, consisted of a range of moves to institute a
new, global order of international charity (“food aid”), a set of compromises
with sovereignty in order to secure the greater end of food security, now the
cornerstone of state strategies to care for the welfare of the population.
Neither of these tendencies went uncontested in the years running up to
India’s Partition and independence.
The Government of India instituted a comprehensive system of food ration-
ing in 1946, adapting and extending the rationing scheme the colonial state had
instituted during the war.101 One American observer, economist T. W. Schultz,
remarked, “No country in the world, with perhaps the exception of Russia, has
gone so far in controlling basic food distribution.” By 1946, the rationing
scheme covered almost eight hundred cities and towns.102 In order to
prevent starvation, thought to be stalking the land, the ofﬁcial ration
98 Gyan Chand, Problem of Population (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1944), 10.
99 V. D. Wickizer and M. K. Bennett, The Rice Economy of Monsoon Asia (Stanford: Stanford
University Food Research Institute, 1941); see C. J. Baker, “Economic Reorganization and the
Slump in Southeast Asia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, 3 (1981): 325–39.
100 See Sugata Bose, “Starvation amidst Plenty: The Making of Famine in Bengal, Honan and
Tonkin, 1942–45,” Modern Asian Studies 24, 4 (1990): 699–727.
101 Government of India, Foodgrains Policy Committee, Interim Report (New Delhi, 1948);
Government of India, Foodgrains Policy Committee, Final Report (New Delhi, 1948).
102 Report of American Famine Mission to India, led by T. W. Schultz, cited in Henry Knight,
Food Administration in India, 1939–47 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), 253.
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approached, paradoxically, starvation levels.103 The interim government in
1947 launched a revised version of the government’s wartime “Grow More
Food Campaign,” and in 1949, the Government of India set the campaign’s
goal as national self-sufﬁciency by 1952.104 Underlying the quest to increase
food production was a growing, and increasingly global fear that without
such an expansion, population growth would produce a Malthusian catastrophe
in India; the war had merely strengthened this conviction held by many
population theorists during the 1930s.105
As UdayMehta has written, with great insight, the “immediate ambit” of pol-
itical power in post-colonial India was “dictated by the intensity of ‘mere
life’”—mass poverty and destitution put most Indians “under the pressing dic-
tates of their bodies.” “And this ambit,” Mehta observes, “can have no limiting
bounds. This simple logic transforms power from a traditional concern with
freedom to a concern with life and its necessities.”106 Ironically, the absence
of “limiting bounds” meant that the concern with national self-sufﬁciency in
food was always tempered by an awareness of the need for food from
outside, and even a willingness to compromise with sovereignty in order to
obtain it, in the form of charity from abroad.
The possibility of gift exchange based on sovereign equality and
anti-colonial solidarity was raised by a little-remarked-upon episode on the
eve of independence. In the midst of a bloody war of independence against
the Dutch, Indonesia’s socialist Prime Minister Soetan Sjahrir made a dramatic
offer to ship ﬁve hundred thousand tons of rice to India as a gesture of post-
colonial solidarity. Sjahrir’s many opponents accused him of giving rice
away while Indonesia itself starved.107 He made the offer directly to Nehru,
as interim Prime Minister, from one nationalist leader to another. Sjahrir’s
offer was deeply symbolic: no longer were India and Indonesia linked in the
language of colonial geography, as the “Monsoon Asia” of wet rice cultivation,
or through the nutritional discourse of the dietary deﬁciencies of rice eaters.108
Now rice was a symbol of international reciprocity, between two sovereign
nations free from European domination.
The colonial administration in India, on its last legs, recognized the signiﬁ-
cance of Sjahrir’s offer, and its deeper implications. British military authorities
refused to provide the Indonesian government with the essential transport they
103 Knight, Food Administration.
104 Report of the Foodgrains Enquiry Committee, 1957 (New Delhi: Ministry of Food and Agri-
culture, 1957), 26–27.
105 On this point, see Hodges, “Governmentality.”
106 Uday S. Mehta, “Indian Constitutionalism: The Articulation of a Political Vision,” in, Dipesh
Chakrabarty, Rochona Majumdar, and Andrew Sartori, eds., From the Colonial to the Postcolonial:
India and Pakistan in Transition (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 13–30, 26–27.
107 Rudolf Mrazek, Sjahrir (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 333.
108 See, for example, Pierre Gourou, The Tropical World: Its Social and Economic Conditions
and Its Future Status, S. H. Beaver and E. D. Laborde, trans. (London: Longman, 1973).
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needed to make good on the offer (claiming these facilities would be diverted
toward the war against Britain’s Dutch allies), and this led to a sharp exchange
between the Government of India and the military command in Southeast
Asia.109 The government warned of “serious repercussions in India” if they
were prevented from “taking full advantage of the Indonesian offer.” The
public was well aware, they insisted, that “we have been offered half a
million tons from Java as a direct offer from Indonesians to the Indian
people.”110 The government was clear in its correspondence with British mili-
tary commanders that “we cannot ignore the political aspect of a decision which
prefers to risk starvation of large numbers in India to chances of Indonesians,
who are on friendliest terms with India, going back on their pledges and making
a misuse of trucks given to them. . . .”111
What the colonial state reluctantly realized was that this post-colonial offer
of rice might signal a new kind of reciprocity, between nation-states (or nation-
states in the making), surer and more reliable than the charity based on natural
feelings of sympathy amongst countrymen, of which Nehru was so skeptical.
The Indonesian offer stood in pointed contrast to the failure of both the
British administration and Indian elites to react to the Bengal famine during
the war. Furthermore, food aid from Indonesia was a “gift” between equals,
at a time when the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
continued to be dominated by the great powers, which monopolized and
tried to control Asia’s rice supplies.112
In the end, very little Indonesian rice reached India; the logistical difﬁculties
proved insurmountable.113 The offer was, ultimately, an unrealistic one, but its
failure reveals much about the unequal relations of power, the unequal recipro-
city, which the international economy of food aid would signify during the Cold
War.114 In 1946, Herbert Hoover led a mission to India to explore the possi-
bility of large-scale food aid to the country. By the mid-1950s, with the insti-
tution of Public Law 480, India became the recipient of—indeed, utterly
dependent upon—American food aid on a massive scale.115
109 IOR, M/4/745, “Indonesia: Rice from Indonesia to India”: Viceroy to Secretary of State for
India, 30 Aug. 1946.
110 IOR, M/4/745, “Indonesia: Rice from Indonesia to India”: Special (Food—Southeast Asia),
18 Sept. 1946.
111 Ibid.
112 For a consideration of the parallel developments concerning the United Nations and its
organizations in the ﬁeld of public health, see Amrith, Decolonizing International Health, ch. 2.
113 IOR, M/4/745, “Indonesia: Rice from Indonesia to India,” Government of India—Food
Department to Indian Agent General, Washington, D.C., 17 Sept. 1946.
114 Space constraints prevent my delving into the origins of food aid from the United States
to India, but see the excellent account in Dennis Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: The United
States and India’s Economic Development, 1947–1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1990).
115 Foodgrains Enquiry Committee, 1957.
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None of these discursive and political shifts in the government of food
immediately after the war went unchallenged. Gandhi’s plaintive critique of
the new order of things indicated that an older conception of the link
between food and national community retained some persuasive power in
India. In 1946 and 1947, he repeatedly attacked the two foundations of the post-
colonial politics of food: dependence on international assistance, and the state’s
attempt to control internal food distribution through rationing.
Gandhi’s critique of the prevailing order functioned by returning to the
semiotics of food and its deeper bio-moral signiﬁcance, its capacity to effect
transformation through the acts of producing, exchanging, and consuming it.
More fundamentally, underlying the tensions over food in this period were dif-
fering visions of the centralization or dispersion of power in post-colonial
India; the relationship of people (lok) and state (rajya); and the location and
the character of the social. Against the impersonal calculus of planning,
Gandhi sought to reemphasize the moral sentiments of sympathy and solidarity,
rather than citizenship of a sovereign state, as the binding force of national
community.
First, Gandhi launched a scathing attack on the system of food rationing the
government had introduced. Centralized control over food, Gandhi insisted,
“gives rise to fraud, suppression of truth, intensiﬁcation of the black market
and to artiﬁcial scarcity.”116 Believing in the wisdom (even the economic
rationality) of the village producer, Gandhi saw state control over food as a
form of oppression. Even worse, however, was the capacity of state centraliza-
tion to “unman” people: “It undoes the teaching of self-help they have been
learning for a generation.”117 The transposition of the notion of atmashakti
from the level of the individual and village community to the nation-state
was one that Gandhi refused to accept. At some points, Gandhi took extreme
positions on this subject: “If people die because they will not labour or
because they will defraud one another,” he wrote, “it will be a welcome deliver-
ance.”118 And even more starkly, he declared, “If a few Indians die in conse-
quence” of a lifting of food controls, “I will shed no tears.”119
Gandhi had not always seen government intervention in India’s food
economy as necessarily pernicious. A year earlier he had declared, “In regard
to the food shortage I admit that Government alone has the resources to cope
with it.”120 Gandhi’s great objection to rationing, and the reason why the
tenor of his opposition to it was increasingly unyielding by the second half
of 1947, was he saw state control over the value of food as detrimental to
116 Gandhi, “Speech at Prayer Meeting,” 3 Nov. 1947, CWMG, vol. 89, 467–68.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Gandhi, “A Letter,” 13 July 1947, Bihar Pachhi Dilhi, CWMG, vol. 88, 328.
120 Gandhi, “Speech at Prayer Meeting,” 18 Feb. 1946, CWMG, vol. 83, 153.
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other measures of value, hence his constant reference to “corruption” and the
black market. “Each one thinks only of himself,” Gandhi argued. “We look
upon our neighbours as strangers instead of as our kith and kin. What does it
matter to us whether they live or die?”121
The second major target of Gandhi’s criticism was the government’s willing-
ness to accept food aid from other nation-states. Here, too, the fundamental
problem he identiﬁed was a decline in the value of “self-reliance,” atmashakti,
which had been so central to the moral economy of food in the early twentieth
century. “The ﬁrst lesson we must learn is self-help and self-reliance,” he
admonished, through which “we shall at once free ourselves from disastrous
dependence upon foreign countries and ultimate bankruptcy.” Returning to a
familiar theme of earlier nationalist discourse, the virtuous bounty of India’s
soils, Gandhi spoke of “a country of mighty rivers, and a rich variety of agri-
cultural land with inexhaustible cattle wealth.”122 Provisioning the nation was a
moral act, and India should “declare with one voice our resolve that we shall
grow our eatables for ourselves and perish bravely in the attempt if we
must.”123
Finally, Gandhi attempted to restore the connection between the individual
body and the body of the nation. In his view, hunger had to be felt and
shared in order to be conquered. His solution, as so often, lay in the practice
of fasting. With unimpeachable, if idiosyncratic logic, Gandhi argued that
the “three per cent” of India’s food supplies that currently came from abroad
could be made up through voluntary fasting. After all, “Hindus observe a
fast or semi-fast every eleventh day each fortnight,” and “Muslims and
others are not prohibited from denying themselves, especially when it is for
the sake of the starving millions.” If all of India “realized the beauty of this
partial self-denial,” he concluded, “India would more than cover the deﬁcit
caused by the voluntary deprivation of foreign aid.”124 Gandhi saw in personal
sacriﬁce and willed hunger a partial solution to starvation. Returning to the
theme of minimum standards as a form of social leveling, he argued, “One
should eat no more than necessary to keep the body in health and ﬁtness
when millions are faced with the prospect of death through starvation.”125
In Gandhi’s view, the bio-moral properties of food shared within the Indian
national community could heal the vicious communal divide manifested in the
violence of 1946 and 1947.126 Hindus and Muslims were “like blood brothers,”
121 Gandhi, “Question Box,” Harijan, 24 March 1946, CWMG, vol. 83, 240.
122 Gandhi, “Speech at Prayer Meeting,” 6 Oct. 1947, CWMG, vol. 89, 294–95.
123 Gandhi, “Mass Murder,” Harijan, 25 Aug. 1946, CWMG, vol. 85, 165–66.
124 Gandhi, “Speech at Prayer Meeting,” 6 Oct. 1947.
125 Gandhi, “Speech at Prayer Meeting,” 18 Feb. 1946.
126 One of the moving testimonies in Urvashi Butalia’s collection of oral histories of Partition
makes this connection explicit: “Such good relations we had that if there was any function that
we had, then we used to call Musalmaans to our homes, they would eat in our houses, but we
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he repeatedly declared. “They were nourished by food grown from the same
soil, quenched their thirst by water of the same river and ﬁnally laid themselves
to rest in the same earth.”127 Food carried with it the properties of the soil in
which it was grown. For Gandhi, human community was what mattered
most; food was a reﬂection of an ethic of obligation and interdependency
that could truly be felt only within the national community. “We are to earn
bread,” Gandhi declared, “by the sweat of our brow—what one Russian
savant has called ‘bread labour.’” The problem with food aid was that it
came devoid of deeper bio-moral worth.128
In the years immediately following India’s independence, it was precisely
this articulation of bodily self-government with the meanings of food that the
post-colonial state so distrusted. The bodily techniques of anti-colonial
struggle, India’s leaders repeatedly told the people, were not appropriate to
politics in a free, sovereign nation.129 Individual sacriﬁce was illegitimate
after freedom’s dawning, because the state would care for the welfare of
each and all.
C O N C L U S I O N
Food, and discourses about food, have remained at the center of Indian political
culture since independence. If the promise of “development” has stood at the
core of the post-colonial state’s claim to legitimacy, it is through the state’s
control of food that this promise of welfare has often taken concrete form.130
The Public Distribution System—with its network of Fair Price Shops, and
other outlets for distribution—together with a complex system of price con-
trols, signiﬁed the state’s commitment to stand between the market and the con-
suming population.131 The acute sensitivity of “starvation deaths” in Indian
political discourse, as indicated at the outset, highlights the enshrining in the
post-colonial state of the notion that to avert starvation is amongst the
highest responsibilities of government. As this essay has sought to demonstrate,
that notion has its roots in the intersection of a number of discourses of food and
would not eat in theirs and this is a bad thing, which I realize now. If they would come to our houses
we would have two utensils in one corner of the house, and we would tell them, pick these up and
eat in them; they would then wash them and keep them aside and this was such a terrible thing. This
was the reason Pakistan was created.” In, Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices from
the Partition of India (London: Hurst, 2000), 31.
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in India,” Economic and Political Weekly, 23 July (2005): 3293–301.
130 Partha Chatterjee, “Development Planning and the Indian State,” in, P. Chatterjee, ed., State
and Politics in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 271–97.
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population in the early twentieth century. Feeding the population has been, and
remains, central to the legitimization of political power in India.
Yet many of the fractures and weaknesses that nutritionists and many others
identiﬁed in the 1930s—the effects of agrarian commercialization upon the
poor, the difﬁculty of effecting cultural change in an area as intimate as the con-
sumption of food—have continued to weaken “state capacity” in post-colonial
India. Nevertheless, the question of food emerges repeatedly as a theme in
populist politics and political mobilization there.132 That is to say, the discur-
sive power of food as a metaphor for justice, for the state’s “pastoral power,”
remains strong, even as the continued existence of widespread hunger and
malnutrition often goes unnoticed and unreported in the media.133
The political and emotional force of the language of “hunger” has not disap-
peared. At particular moments, it has reemerged at the heart of political dis-
course in order to legitimize new forms of state action, and to associate the
distribution of food with care and solidarity. Launching a state-wide scheme
in 1982 to universalize the provision of mid-day meals to all children in
Tamil Nadu’s government schools, the charismatic actor-turned-Chief-Minister
of Tamil Nadu, M. G. Ramachandran, turned to the language of hunger and suf-
fering, of compassion for the poor, as a rationale for one of the most ambitious
nutritional interventions in post-colonial India.
This scheme is an outcome of my experience of extreme starvation at an age when
I knew only to cry when I was hungry. But for the muniﬁcence of a woman next
door who extended a bowl of rice gruel to us and saved us from the cruel hand of
death, we would have departed this world long ago. Such merciful women folk,
having great faith in me, elected me as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. To wipe the
tears of these women I have taken up this project . . . To picture lakhs and lakhs of
poor children who gather to partake of nutritious meals in the thousands of hamlets
and villages all over Tamil Nadu . . . will be a glorious event.134
The tropes that Ramachandran invokes are familiar from the perspective of
the 1930s: the idea of children gathering to eat together as a marker of social
solidarity; the appeal to the physical sensation, the pain, of lacking food; and
the invocation of love and charity as reﬂected in giving food to those
without it. What had changed was the nature of the state, and its relationship
to the people. Ramachandran’s initiative resulted in a highly technical nutri-
tional intervention that depended upon precisely the bureaucratic categories,
132 For an illuminating discussion of how populist political discourse in India draws on earlier
political languages of legitimacy, see Subir Sinha, “Lineages of the Developmentalist State: Trans-
nationality and Village India, 1900–1965,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 50, 1
(2008): 57–90.
133 Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); Dan
Banik, Starvation and India’s Democracy (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).
134 Barbara Harriss, Child Nutrition and Poverty in South India: Noon Meals in Tamil Nadu
(New Delhi: Concept Publishing), 10.
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the crosscutting subdivisions of population, that Partha Chatterjee as seen as the
terrain of Indian “political society.”135
It is by treating the population in all of its multiplicity and diversity that both
the state and activists for social justice see the possibility of justice and solidar-
ity. Responding to the PUCL’s petition, the Supreme Court of India stated in
July 2001, “In our opinion, what is of utmost importance is to see that food
is provided to the aged, inﬁrm, disabled, destitute women, destitute men who
are in danger of starvation, pregnant and lactating women and destitute chil-
dren, especially in cases where they or members of their family do not have
sufﬁcient funds to provide food for them.” The court directed states to identify
families below the ofﬁcial poverty line as a matter of urgency, so that those
families could be provided with food assistance.136 Activists are equally
adept at deploying the categories of the developmental state—of “APL”
(above poverty line) and “BPL” (below poverty line) families, for instance—
even while making moral arguments about the state’s responsibility to
protect all life, or to protect the population from the depredations of traders
and hoarders. What is striking here is that underlying the development of
secular interventions to secure the welfare of the population is the persistence
of older, often religiously informed ideas about community and charity, and
about suffering.
The argument throughout this paper has been that struggles over food, and
discourses of food and hunger, go to the very heart of competing conceptions
of justice, responsibility, and the value of human life. With a deepening “food
crisis” at the time of this writing, it seems safe to predict that food will remain
central to the exercise of governmental power in India, and its legitimization.137
135 Partha Chatterjee, Politics of the Governed: Reﬂections on Popular Politics in Most of the
Word (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
136 At http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/case.html/.
137 See Frontline, 25 Apr. 2008.
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